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POS TULA TES OF PSYCHOLOGY 451 of analysis bulks so largely in the literature of experimental psychology that a recent writer has questioned the right of the science to its adjective, declaring that an experiment is something more than a measurement made by the help of delicate instruments.' And there can be no doubt that much of the criticism passed upon the new psychology depends on the critic's failure to recognize its morphological character. We are often told that our treatment of feeling and emotion, of reasoning, of the self is inadequate; that the experimental method is valuable for the investigation of sensation and idea, but can carry us no farther. The answer is that the results gained by dissection of the ' higher' processes will always be disappointing to those who have not themselves adopted the dissector's standpoint. Protoplasm consists, we are told, of carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, and hydrogen; but this statement would prove exceedingly disappointing to one who had thought to be informed of the phenomena of contractility and metabolism, respiration and reproduction. Taken in its appropriate context, the jejuneness of certain chapters in mental anatomy, implying, as it does, the fewness of the mental elements, is a fact of extreme importance.
2. There is, however, a functional psychology, over and above this psychology of structure. We may regard mind, on the one hand, as a complex of processes, shaped and moulded under the conditions of the physical organism. We may regard it, on the other hand, as the collective name for a system of functions of the psychophysical organism. The two points of view are not seldom confused. The phrase 'association of ideas,' e. g., may denote either the structural complex, the associated sensation group, or the functional process of recognition and recall, the associating of formation to formation. In the former sense it is morphological material, in the latter it belongs to what I must name (the phrase will not be misunderstood) a physiological psy- Just as experimental psychology is to a large extent concerned with problems of structure, so is ' descriptive' psychology, ancient and modern, chiefly occupied with problems of function. Memory, recognition, imagination, conception, judgment, attention, apperception, volition, and a host of verbal nouns, wider or narrower in denotation, connote, in the discussions of descriptive psychology, functions of the total organism. That their underlying processes are psychical in character is, so to speak, an accident; for all practical purposes they stand upon the same level as digestion and locomotion, secretion and excretion. The organism remembers, wills, judges, recognizes, etc., and is assisted in its life-struggle by remembering and willing. Such functions are, however, rightly included in mental science, inasmuch as they constitute, in sum, the actual, working mind of the individual man. They are not functions of the body, but functions of the organism, and they may-nay, they must-be examined by the methods and under the regulative principles of a mental 'physiology. ' The adoption of these methods does not at all prejudice the ultimate and extra-psychological problem of the function of mentality at large in the universe of things. Whether consciousness really has a survival-value, as James supposes, or whether it is a mere epiphenomenon, as Ribot teaches, is here an entirely irrelevant question.
It cannot be said that this functional psychology, despite what we may call its greater obviousness to investigation, has been worked out either with as much patient enthusiasm or with as much scientific accuracy as has the psychology of mind structure. It is true, and it is a truth which the experimentalist has direct reference to the experimental work of Angell and Moore (Psychological Review, May, i896).
Professor Caldwell, too, insists on the importance of the study of psychological function, but forgets that function presupposes structure (International Journal of Ethics, July, I898, p. 466).
It may be mentioned, further, that a good deal of the introductory writing in works upon modem logic and theory of knowledge-Bosanquet, Bradley, Hobhouse, Wundt-falls within the scope of functional psychology as here defined. Professor Creighton, indeed, suggests that logic may be distinguished from the psychology of thought as physiology, the science of function, from morphology, the science of structure (An Introductory Logic, p. 6). I think that, in spite of present overlapping, logic has a field of its own, which is not the field of functional psychology -though the question cannot be gone into in this place.
POS7ILA TES OF PSYCHOLOGY 453 should be quick to recognize and emphasize, that there is very much of value itf descriptive psychology. But it is also true that the methods of descriptive psychology cannot, in the nature of the case, lead to results of scientific finality. The same criticism holds, as things stand, of individual psychology, which is doing excellent pioneer work in the sphere of function. Experimental psychology has added much to our knowledge, functional as well as structural, of memory, attention, imagination, etc., and Will, in the future, absorb and quantify the results of these other, new coordinate branches. Still, I do not think that anyone who has followed the course of the experimental method, in its application to the higher processes and states of mind, can doubt that the main interest throughout has lain in morphological analysis, rather than in ascertainment of function. Nor are the reasons far to seek. We must remember that experimental psychology arose by way of reaction against the faculty psychology of the last century. This was a metaphysical, not a scientific, psychology. There is, in reality, a great difference between, say, memory regarded as a function of the psychophysical organism, and memory regarded as a faculty of the substantial mind. At the same time, these two memories are nearer together than are the faculty memory and the memories or memory complexes of psychological anatomy. There is, further, the danger that, if function is studied before structure has been fully elucidated, the student may fall into that acceptance of teleological explanation which is fatal to scientific advance: witness, if witness be necessary, the recrudescence of vitalism in physiology.' Psychology might thus put herself for the second time, and no less surely though by different means, under the dominion of philosophy. In a word, the historical conditions of psychology rendered it inevitable that, when the time came for the transformation from philosophy to science, problems should be formulated, explicitly or implicitly, as static rather than dynamic, structural rather than functional. We may notice also the fact that elementary morphology is intrinsically an easier study than elementary physiology, and that scientific men are so far subject to the law of I Cf Burdon Sanderson, in Science Progress, March, I896. inertia, whose effects we see in the conservatism of mankind at large, that they prefer the continued application of a fruitful method to the adoption of a new standpoint for the standpoint's sake.
I may, perhaps, digress here for a moment, to raise and attempt to answer two questions which naturally suggest themselves: the questions whether this conservatism is wise, and whether it is likely to persist. I believe that both should be answered in the affirmative. As has been indicated above, the morphological study of mind serves, as no other method of study can, to enforce and sustain the thesis that psychology is a science, and not a province of metaphysics; and recent writing shows clearly enough that this truth has need of constant reiteration. Moreover, there is still so much to be done in the field of analysis (not simply analysis of the higher processes, though these will of course benefit in the long run, but also analysis of perception and feeling and idea) that a general swing of the laboratories towards functional work would be most regrettable.
It seems probable, if one may presume to read the signs of the times, that experimental psychology has before it a long period of analytical research, whose results, direct and indirect, shall ultimately serve as basis for the psychology of function; unless, indeed,-and this is beyond predicting,-the demands laid upon psychology by the educationalist becodie so insistent as partially to divert the natural channels of investigation. ' The remaining four psychologies may be dismissed with a briefer mention. 3. Ontogenetic psychology, the psychology of individual childhood and adolescence, is now a subject of wide interest, and has a large literature of its own. 4 Taxonomic psychology is not yet, and in all likelihood will not be, for some time to come, anything more than an ingredient in ' descriptive,' and a portion of individual, psychology.
It deals with such topics as the classification of emotions, instincts and impulses, temperaments, etc., the hierarchy of psychological ' selves,' the typical mind of social classes (artists, soldiers, literary men), and so forth. account is correct, we must admit that the morphology of mind is still a battlefield for individual opinions; we-shall hardly escape the difficulty by the mere statement that Ebbinghaus is an experimentalist, and Brentano not.
When, however, we turn to Brentano himself, the matter assumes a different complexion. Brentano's principal criterion of psychical, as contradistinguished from physical phenomena, is that of ' intentional inexistence' or ' immanent objectivity,' which we may paraphrase as reference to contents, direction upon something as object.' " Every psychical phenomenon contains in it something as object, though not every one in the same way. In ideation something is ideated, in judgment something admitted or rejected, in love and hate something loved and hated, in desire something desired, etc."2 This is evidently the language of function, not of structure. Indeed, Brentano uses the phrasespsychisches Phinomen and Seelenthktigkeit interchangeably; his ' fundamental' or ' principal classes of psychical phenomena' are the 'mental activities' of ideation (not 'idea ! '), judgment and interest (love and hate, the emotive processes).3 The spirit of his whole psychology is physiological; and when, on occasion, he discusses a point in anatomy,4 he leaves his reader in no doubt as to the shift of venue. Now the mental elements of the experimentalists, the bare sensation and the bare feeling, are abstractions, innocent of any sort of objective reference.5 We cannot fairly compare Brentano's 'judgment' with them. Nay, more, we cannot fairly say that he would have posited an ultimate judgment process if he had adopted the anatomical point of view; since he has not adopted it, the speculation is absurd. The ' psychology from the empirical standpoint' is a systematization of mental ' activities,' i. e., of the mental functions of the human organism.
This wave, then, has not overwhelmed us. Escaping it, we while it remains as a theoretical possibility,' has been generally given up by the experimental school.2 Simple affective processes, again, are regarded by a large majority as elemental. Both Wundt and Kilpe are at some pains to make clear the essential difference between sensation and affection. Lehmann and Ebbinghaus are equally explicit. Ziehen does not give a place to feeling beside sensation and idea; his chapters are entitled ' The Affective Tone of Sensation' and 'The Affective Tone of Ideas,' and his treatment makes affective tone an attribute, coordinate with the intensity and quality of sensation and the clearness and contents (meaning) of idea. Nevertheless, he speaks in one passage of the cortical substrate of this tone as "an entirely new psychophysiological process." Minsterberg, on the other hand, denies the ultimateness of feeling altogether, and seeks to reduce it to the sensations accompanying movements of flexion and extension, reflexly released.3 There is, further, an ' inside' controversy as to the number of affective qualities. But analysis will some day settle the question whether there are two of these (Kiilpe), or two in the sphere of sensation and many more in that of idea (Ziehen), or an inexhaustible variety under the six heads of pleasantness and unpleasantness, tension and relaxation, excitement and tranquillization (Wundt).4
It is natural, in view of the intrinsic difficulty of the subject, that the psychology of feeling should be in a less settled state than the psychology of sensation. sensation qualities range between maxima of difference, and affective qualities between maxima of opposition or antithesis. Any one of these statements is adequate to the psychological requirements. The last of them, however, as Wundt's exposition shows, implies that we are already familiar with the attributes of which sensation and affection are constituted. We must devote a brief space to their consideration. Once more, we set out from a point of universal agreement. "There are two indispensable determinants of every psychical element, quality and intensity." But discussion is not slow to begin. For these two attributes or determinants are, evidently, of different kinds. Quality is specific and individual; it is quality that makes the elemental process a blue or a sweet, a pleasant or a c of the third octave. Intensity, on the contrary, is a general attribute, common to all modalities of sensation and qualities of affection. Hence, while some psychologists rank the two determinations together, as coordinate, others set aside quality for itself, and count intensity along with extent and duration as equipollent characteristics, whether of all the mental elements or of certain great groups of qualities. There is also much difference of opinion as to the precise place to be ascribed to the attributes of extent and duration. For Wundt, who holds a genetic theory, psychological space is the resultant of a two-dimensional system of qualitative local signs multiplied into, or fused with, a one-dimensional intensive system of sensations aroused by movement. It is, primarily, tactual or visual. Psychological time, in the same way, is the resultant of qualitatively varied feelings multiplied into, or fused with, the same intensive system of sensations. The affective processes, in abstraction, are timeless; the primary sources of temporal ideas are audition and ' internal touch.' It follows that space and time, extent and duration, can be predicated only of formations, not of elements. Spatial arrangement (Wundt makes no distinction between 'spatial arrangement' and ' space' as 'absolute contents') cannot "be an original attribute of the elements, analogous to the intensity or quality of sensations ;" it " results from the bringing together of these elements," which means the " arising of new 462 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
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arrangement. "As these attributes [clearness and obscurity, distinctness and indistinctnessl arise always and only from the interconnection of the various psychical formations, they cannot be considered as determinants of the psychical elements." Yet, on Wundt's own principle of relativity, the same thing would be true of sensation intensity; we cannot say anything of the intensity of a sensation unless a formation-at least two sensations, side by side-be there for ' comparison.' Moreover, we must exclude genetic arguments here as before. If we make analytic introspection the test, we cannot but admit that the ultimate sensation may be conceived of as clear or obscure.' I conclude, then, that the affective element is constituted of quality, intensity, and duration; the sense element (sensation or idea) of quality, intensity, duration, clearness, and (in some cases) extent.2 Quality is intrinsic and individual; intensity and clearness are ' relative' characteristics; duration and extent are, very probably, extrinsic translations into structure of the lowest terms of a functional series. And the corollary is that the ' elements' of the experimentalists, as they themselves have been the first to urge, are artifacts, abstractions, usefully isolated for scientific ends, but not found in experience save as connected with their like. 2'Locality,' Stumpf' s Tonfarbe, Passy' sfpouvoir odorant, Muller' s Eindringlichkeit, etc., are all attributes which admit of resolution into constituents. Miss Washburn has recently maintained the thesis that familiarity is a " peculiar property of centrally excited sensations." I do not think that this view of recognition will find general acceptance. In any event, however, familiarity would be a fundierte attribute, predicable not of the sensation but of the sensation complex. See this REVIEW, May, i897.
It is unnecessary to

